The World Court of Moscow has issued an administrative arrest for human rights activist and Khodorkovsky supporter Lev Ponomarev, the head of For Human Rights movement, for failing to obey the police.

The activist was detained on August 22, the Day of the Russian Flag, after opposition activists were trying to walk down the streets in Moscow with a Russian flag.

“I believe the ruling of the court is illegal. This is a purely a political order,” said the human rights activist who plans to appeal the decision.

Ponomarev has been an active defendant of the rights of those who fell victims of the government’s attack on YUKOS.

Note by Jeremy: Mr Ponomarev is a distinguished member of our Committee.

On August 5, 2010, defense attorney Elena Liptser filed a motion in which the defense asked the court to send an official request to the German authorities asking them to help facilitate questioning of Frank Rieger, a German citizen and former vice president at YUKOS-RM, via a video-conference. In addition, the defense motioned to add to the case file and to enter into evidence Rieger’s record of interview by counsel.

• Read Rieger’s record of interview by counsel

She noted that despite having been summoned two and a half months before Rieger failed to receive any official documents from the Russian Federation. Rieger wrote to the Khamovnicheskiy Court after hearing in the media about his summons, which had not yet been received. Rieger then asked Federal Judge Danilkin to consent to him being questioned in Germany, by means of a live video-conference, with a pre-arranged date to allow all parties to fully participate. The defense included Rieger’s request in their motion filed by Lipster.

Also included in the defense motion were many references to Rieger’s interview by counsel, conducted in March 2010. Reiger described being detained at the Sheremetyevo Airport, then being taken for an interrogation conducted by investigator Rusanova. He described how Rusanova told him that as a witness he was not entitled to have an attorney present during the interrogation, while her colleagues were providing misleading information about his location to his attorney and a representative from the German Consulate, ultimately not letting them see Rieger.

Rieger also described how during the interrogation Rusanova asked him questions then presented him with written responses she wanted to him to confirm. According to Rieger’s deposition, all of Rusanova’s questions boiled down to asking him to confirm that Khodorkovsky stole billions of dollars. Rusanova then refused to let him leave, informing him that her superior, investigator Khatypov, was not satisfied with Rieger’s answers.

Ultimately, after 8 hours of continuous interrogation he was finally allowed to leave. Afterwards, Rieger noted, he was informed that the German Foreign Affairs Ministry sent an official note of protest concerning his illegal detention. The next day, when he attempted to leave Russia on a scheduled business trip, Rieger was detained once again. After an hour and a half of detntion, he was handed his travel documents and was strongly hinted to never to return to Russia.

On August 16, 2010, Judge Danilkin ruled to deny the defense’s motion to have the court officially request the German authorities facilitate Rieger’s appearance in court via a video-conference and to enter into evidence Rieger’s record of interview by counsel.

Therein, he comprehensively answers – from his prison cell – questions mainly concerning

–  his former activities as a businessman – which, according to his statements, did never violate Russian laws

–  his political activities – which included the financing of opposition parties but not the unrealistic plan to become president of Russia

–  the Russian judicial system – which he criticizes as a corrupt system of mere punishment

–  his future personal fate – about which, in his view, the final (political) decision has not yet been made

–  the political future of his country – characterized by a need of modernization, which requires, in his assessment, effectively working democratic institutions.

In reply to the final question how long he will still be able to finance his defence and campaigns in his favour, Khodorkovsky answers that this family and friends would, according to their possibilities, continue this struggle even without him if justice could not be achieved during his lifetime.

I would like to add, once again, that there are some supporters in Russia and abroad for whom this struggle is part of their commitment to human rights and not a question of money.

Maren Koop

05 Aug 2010 — Germany

Here is reported on Markus Löning, new Human Rights Commissioner to the German government, who has been criticised due to his little experience in the field of human rights and is slowly gaining respect. According to the article Löning focuses on two aspects of his work: the abolition of the death penalty and the protection of the freedom of opinion and the press. Stawski states that Löning will visit the Mikhail Khodorkovsky trial in Moscow soon and wants to do everything to arouse the interest of the public on the case.

The court turned down the relevant petition filed by the defense team saying that their arguments “were not legal.”

It should be clear that the court’s decision not to allow the PWC audit reports to be used in evidence is perverse in the extreme, and designed to ensure that highly relevant opinions – those of the independent auditors – are not taken into account. If anyone doubted that this is a mockery of justice, the decision of the court in this matter should make it beyond question. This is a complete farce.

http://www.mantlethought.org/content/oligarch-martyr

Putin’s Oil: The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia
by Martin Sixsmith
Continuum, 2010, 311 pp.

It plays like a scene from a Hollywood thriller–a businessman in a desperate bid to conclude a deal he thinks will ensure his safety, sees his plans fall apart as masked gunmen board his private jet and take him off into a snowy Siberian evening. Only this wasn’t a scene from a summer blockbuster, it was instead the last moments of freedom for maverick Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who in the early 2000s engaged in a high-profile struggle with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin for control over the energy conglomerate Yukos – then Russia’s largest firm and the fourth-largest energy company in the world. Their fight, and Khodorkovsky’s subsequent fate, is the subject of a new book: Putin’s Oil: The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia, by former BBC correspondent Martin Sixsmith.

Khodorkovsky’s arrest and trial turned him into a cause célèbre for critics of the Kremlin; thankfully Sixsmith (largely) avoids the impulse to lionize Khodorkovsky and by doing so, manages to give the reader a more complete portrait of a very complex man. Mikhail Khodorkovsky (now 47) came of age in the dying days of the Soviet Union; even as a young man he was gripped by an entrepreneurial spirit while living in a system that emphasized the collective good over the will of the individual. Luckily for Khodorkovsky, as he reached adulthood Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Soviet Union and a spirit of reform gripped the country. Khodorkovsky took advantage of a loosening of the rules to first create a computer consulting firm, which later transformed into a holding company called Menatep. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 came a desire to rapidly transform Russia into a market-based economy by rapidly privatizing state-held assets in a policy devised by Western-based economists and euphemistically called “shock therapy.” Khodorkovsky would take advantage of his business knowledge, close ties to the government of President Boris Yeltsin, and the chaotic nature of the privatizations, to quickly amass a personal fortune that would include controlling interest in Russia’s massive oil conglomerate, Yukos, picked up by Khodorkovsky at a fraction of its alleged worth.

One man who was paying attention throughout the 1990s was Vladimir Putin, who enjoyed his own meteoric rise from little-known former intelligence officer to presidential successor to the ailing Yeltsin in 1999. Putin shared in a popular perception fostered by the economic chaos of the 1990s in Russia – that the “oligarchs” (Khodorkovsky included) in effect “stole” the riches of Russia by manipulating the poorly-run economic system. For example, in the early Nineties every Russian was given vouchers so that they could purchase a share of a state industry being privatized; in practice though, Russians with little experience in private property ownership during Soviet times, simply sold their vouchers, which were bought by the bushel by a small cadre of businessmen (who would become the mega-wealthy oligarchs). In taking office, Putin felt his mission was to right this historic wrong and bring the oligarchs to heel. By 2003, his mission was largely accomplished – the 1990s class of oligarchs had either become reliable allies of the Kremlin, or gone off to live in self-imposed exile abroad; the main holdout was Khodorkovsky. For his part, Khodorkovsky refused to back down, launching a nonprofit organization to strengthen Russia’s civil society, while musing aloud about becoming personally involved in the nation’s politics.

By 2003 it seemed that the two men were set on a collision course. The motivations for their actions are a large part of the drama that drives Putin’s Oil, but author Sixsmith has a near-impossible task: to give the reader insight into the inner thoughts and desires of two men to whom he has no direct access (Khodorkovsky languishes in a Russian prison, while Putin is ensconced within the Kremlin walls). Sixsmith relies on an expansive series of interviews with people intimately involved in the machinations of 2003, several dozen in all. Ultimately though, Sixsmith isn’t able to give a definitive answer to the motivations question.

Khodorkovsky at times seems like a man done in by his own sense of hubris, betrayed by his naïve belief in the rule of law in Russia, or someone who deliberately set out to wind up in jail, thus becoming a modern-day martyr for Russia’s future. Putin’s efforts at prosecuting Khodorkovsky, meanwhile, at turns seem motivated by petty anger toward his rival, fear over the rise of a powerful political adversary, or, as Sixsmith makes a compelling case for, merely a victim himself of powerful entrenched special interests within the Kremlin that even he, the President, is powerless to stop.

Khodorkovsky’s trial and subsequent banishment to a remote, high-security prison in Siberia take up a large portion of Putin’s Oil (Sixsmith dwells a little too much on the minutiae of the legal wrangling behind the case). The proceedings do lead the reader to ponder an important question in light of the recent bilateral summit between Russia’s current President Dmitry Medvedev and President Barack Obama – does the rule of law in fact exist in Russia? Sixsmith makes a compelling case that laws in today’s Russia can be bent (or simply ignored outright) – an interpretation that runs counter to Medvedev’s oft-stated goals of battling corruption and reforming the Russian economy by encouraging foreign investment, including his signature project of developing a Russian “Silicon Valley” to grow the nation’s high tech sector. Though as Khodorkovsky himself noted in the months leading up to his arrest, serious foreign investment – the kind that could truly establish Russia as a market economy and grow the nation’s middle class – are unlikely to occur so long as the law is viewed as malleable. Part of Khodorkovsky’s undoing seemed to have been his desire to introduce Western-style business practices into Yukos’ operations and his attempts to attract foreign investment. In that respect, Putin’s Oil could be seen as a cautionary tale for those looking to do business in the new Russia.

Finally, Khodorkovsky himself offers a provocative glimpse into the Russian psyche. Sixsmith makes it clear that Khodorkovsky views himself as a kind of martyr and, if his inner circle (the only ones with direct contact with him in jail today) are to be believed, the former billionaire has become a humble aesthetic [ascetic], not longing for the mind-boggling wealth he once enjoyed. In essence, he is sacrificing his own luxuries, family, and freedom, all for the greater good of the people. It’s tempting to view him as a man trying to come to terms with a harsh future in a Russian prison, but Khodorkovsky showed signs of embracing martyrdom even before his 2003 arrest. And during his trial, he repeatedly referred to himself and his wife as Decembrists, the name for a group of Russians who in 1825 refused to pledge their loyalty to a czar they felt a despot; the Decembrists were eventually exiled, along with their families, en masse to Siberia. Khodorkovsky knew his future was in peril before his 2003 arrest, yet he refused to take the path of other oligarchs into a lavish, self-imposed exile in London or Tel Aviv. Allowing what he believed was an illegitimate government to crush him, Khodorkovsky felt, would provide a cautionary tale for all Russians, and would (eventually) usher in the reforms he tried to bring about in the early 2000s. Or, as Khodorkovsky himself wrote from prison: “today it is hard for me to speak physically, but no one can say that I do not have the moral right to speak.” They are words from a fascinatingly complex man.

——————————————————————————–

July 23, 2010

It has been about a month since the winds started changing for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev’s trial. It’s too soon to tell whether this is a real change of direction; however, something has happened, something that not so long ago was unthinkable and which has whipped commentators into a frenzy of interpretations and speculation.

This is the news: on the 21st and 22nd June, in the Khamovnichesky tribunal in Moscow, where the second trial against the former oligarch is taking place (accused of fraudulently stealing 350 million tonnes of oil from their own company, Yukos, between 1998 and 2003, which could give them a prison sentence of up to 22 years), two excellent defense witnesses arrived: German Gref and Viktor Khristenko. Gref is the former Minister for Finance and current CEO of Sberbank (currently the largest bank in Russia) and Khristenko is the currently the Minister for Finance in Putin’s government.

This is already an unlikely event: until now, the president of the tribunal, Viktor Danilkin, consistently refused political witnesses for the defence, starting from Putin himself. What is more important, however, is that both texts highlighted the absurdity of the charges brought by Valery Lakhtin. They have in fact stated that it was impossible that the theft of such a large amount of oil could pass unobserved by those responsible for the economy. Neither of these witnesses, who were in charge of the economy, ever noticed anything of the sort. To complicate things further, the number one news channel, who has followed the debate with little interest but in this case announced the news, if with much sobriety.

Commentators unanimously agree that it would not be possible for such important figures such as Gref and Khristenko, to present themselves at such a delicate trial without first having cleared this with the head of government, i.e. Putin, and having obtained at least tacit consent. Obviously, there is no rule for ministers to have to ask their superiors for clearance to attend a trial, however, as ex-Premier Mikhail Kasyanov states, interviewed by the Russian press “there are unwritten rules which regulate the relationships between members of the government” and taking this initiative without first checking with their leader would be considered an act of infidelity. This would imply self-exclusion from the circle of trusted advisors. “I don’t believe in the independence of Judge Danilkin,” states Alexei Kondaurov, former Communist Member of Parliament and retired security services agent. “Danilkin is a terrified man, clearly someone has ordered him to call on Gref and Khristenko and not others.”

Something behind the scenes of this trial seems to have changed, even though no-one can safely say what this is. What is becoming increasingly apparent, however, is that this second trial is embarrassing the political establishment much more than the first. At the end of the day, when Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were first sent to prison for 8 years in 2005, they had some good reasons: it was the result of a bloodthirsty political battle between the main oligarchs who emerged from the turbulent 90s and the new power of the Kremlin, determined to confirm its own authority. First Boris Berezovsky, then Vladimir Gusinsky and finally Mikhail Khodorkovsky, paid for having opposed Putin and his policies. Furthermore, in the eyes of the public (who had never liked them particularly) they were paying for the important mistake of having taken over, in a very opaque way and with the help of Boris Yeltsin’s team, the riches of the whole country (this odyssey is told in a very good book, “The Oligarchs”, written by Pulitzer prize winning David Hoffman, and it is a real pity that no Italian editor has yet translated it). All of this is history now, oligarchs no longer exist (the extremely rich exist, but this is different) and that which was a battle of power has transformed into pure persecution).

The problem now is that the trial is finishing, and those behind the scene are not sure what to do. What was clear one year ago is now murky. For this reason, a sentence which was predicted to be announced mid-August, to guarantee universal disinterest, has now been postponed: the defense is yet to close its arguments, which will be followed by more debate on both sides, and then the final statements. The verdict is therefore not expected until October/November.

The verdict is the real sticking-point. The court will have to decide whether the two former Yukos chiefs are guilty or innocent. Both solutions, politically speaking, present many problems. A guilty verdict will be internationally discrediting to Russian justice, at a time where the Kremlin is trying to improve Russia’s image to encourage investment in its modernization projects where western partners require “certainty in the law”. Everyone knows that the accusation of having stolen 350 million tonnes of oil is absurd. Perhaps others had hoped that the prosecution would have found more valid charges, clearly this did not happen. Only 6 months ago, Vladimir Putin, replying to a barrage of questions surrounding Khodorkovsky, had implied “issues of blood” in Yukos’ past. This has nothing to do with the current trial, but an “innocent” verdict would imply that the Prime Minister had lost some of his power. There is another game, apart from the uncertain verdict, which is complicating the destiny of Khodorkovsky’s trial: which of the “duo” (Putin-Medvedev) who will stand for election in 2012? It is not difficult to imagine that judges and prosecutors would sell their soul to devil to know the answer.
In the absence of other news, and thanks to the novelty of the high profile testimonies of Gref and Khristenko, Moscow commentators are spreading a variety of speculations. According to some, the Kremlin and the government have been keeping their distance from an embarrassing trial which brings no visible advantages. In this case, Judge Danilkin would have the unwelcome responsibility of making his own decision and, as they say in Moscow, “putting the commas in their right place”, whilst avoiding shooting himself in the foot. Others say that Khodorkovsky’s enemies in the government (i.e. Putin and his deputy Igor Sechin) have lost interest in the trial, whereas Medvedev’s team is increasing its influence, as it is clear the President doesn’t want a guilty verdict.

There is, of course, a third hypothesis: that the audition of these two important witnesses has been a means of pulling wool over the eyes of international commentators. At the end of the day, the interrogation of Gref and Khristenko has happened at the ideal time: on the eve of Dmitri Medvedev’s trip to the USA to meet Barak Obama. “They showed our foreign guests,” states Kiril Kabanov, president of the nongovernmental committee for the fight against corruption, “that in Russia even ministers can be called into court and asked to respond to difficult questions.” But this is a typical of those who believe that politics is one lie after another, and underestimates the importance of the second Khodorkovsky trial to politicians in this country.

It is therefore true that Medvedev is keeping well away from this trial: the president is very interested in the judicial system, considered to be one of Russia’s weaknesses, as a whole, but is very careful to stay out of single cases. Particularly in one such as this, which is likely to have been a part of the 2008 pre-electoral agreement with Putin, and where mistakes could mean the possibility of losing the candidacy in the 2012 presidential elections. However, it is equally evident that an unfavourable verdict could damage the country’s image. Not forgetting the trials in The Hague and Strasbourg, heavily involved in the Yukos affair, which could present problems in future.

As for Vladimir Putin, he is a practical man. He knows that Khodorkovsky is not a political danger, and he probably doesn’t feel the trial is as important now as it used to be. Perhaps he is beginning to see the negative effects that a guilty verdict on such flimsy accusations could have, and therefore is trying to step away from the events in the Khamovnichesky. If this was the case, then the extreme nervousness shown by prosecutor Lakhtin during the testimonies of Gref and Khristenko would be easier to understand, who would be used as a scapegoat.

These are, therefore, the hypotheses, the suppositions, the speculations, the hopes and the fears that surround the trial in Moscow after the turning point in June. The most prudent, of course, are the defendants’ lawyers. The testimonies of Gref and Khristenko are seen as very positive, both for having turn apart the accusations and for having taken place at all: “In Russia, few current ministers will come out for the defense, particularly for a case like this one,” states one of Khodorkovsky’s lawyers to Il Foglio, who wishes to remain anonymous. “It is a clear that there is a significant gap between the country’s leaders. On the other hand, if Russia wants to modernize, it will need help from international partners, and it will not be able to obtain it without a positive result to this trial. Freeing Khodorkovsky would be Russia’s best business card.” But what about the sentence? “Only a strong political will can influence a positive result, perhaps by finding a compromise. Even though we might have to wait for the next presidential elections.”

In such a complicated case, with so many political variables that are still changing, the main strategy of the defense remains the pressure that can be exerted on Russia by international partners. This is the reason that many supporting organizations organize protests around the world to attract public attention. The most recent happened in Rome. Promoted by the Memorial association and the newspaper Novaya Gazeta at the Arciconfraternità dei Bergamaschi, the exhibition “Drawing [in]justice” was opened for one week, showing images by artists from different generations centred around the theme of the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev trial.

Reuters – The chief executive of Russia’s largest oil firm failed to appear in court on Thursday after being summoned to give evidence in the trial of jailed oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

State controlled Rosneft rose to become Russia’s largest oil company by buying the main production assets of YUKOS, which was carved up after its owner Khodorkovsky fell foul of the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin.

Lawyers for Khodorkovsky, who is serving an eight-year jail sentence, had asked the court to summon Rosneft CEO Sergei Bogdanchikov to give evidence in a new trial that could keep Khodorkovsky in prison for another 22 years.

But Bogdanchikov — the most prominent businessman yet called as a witness at the trial — failed to appear.

“Witness Bogdanchikov did not appear. The reason is unknown,” Judge Viktor Danilkin said in court.

The judge gave no more details and court officials refused to comment on the situation.
Spokesmen for Rosneft refused repeated requests for comment.

A Russian government source said Bogdanchikov on Thursday had met Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who is also Rosneft board chairman, about investments in the southern region of Kabardino-Balkaria. A power station in the region was attacked by insurgents on Wednesday.

“The court was given no explanation for the absence of the witness though according to the law he should immediately inform the court giving serious grounds. This was not done,” Vadim Klyuvgant, Khodorkovsky’s lead lawyer, told reporters.

Khodorkovsky’s business empire — which pumped more oil than OPEC member Qatar — was carved up and sold to state-controlled companies after his 2003 arrest.

Khodorkovsky has always said he is the victim of corrupt officials under Putin who feared his political ambitions and wanted to carve up his YUKOS oil company, which was once widely held by U.S. and European emerging market investment funds.

Putin, who stepped down as Kremlin chief in 2008 and is now prime minister, has rejected any hint of politics in the case against Khodorkovsky, whom he has compared to U.S. gangster Al Capone.

Reader comment:
Jul 22, 2010 4:25pm BST

The comment by prime minister Putin comparing Mikhail Khodorkovsky to a gangster was prejudicial to a fair trial, the trial being under way at the time. Although the trial is universally recognised as a pseudo-legal charade intended to keep Khodorkovsky in jail, nonetheless it was extremely injudicious for Putin to make his invidious – and untruthful – comparison. Putin also sought to interfere in the trial by alleging on national tv last December that certain murders were ordered by the Yukos chiefs, for which there is no evidence. The Russian prime minister must not interfere or put pressure in judicial proceedings, if they are to be seen to be fair. There is however no chance that the current trial will be seen as fair by any observers except the coterie of shills.

Language note: “shill” – According to the Wikipedia definition, “The term is also used to describe a person who is paid to help a political party or other advocacy organization to gain adherents; as with the situation of selling goods or services, the shill gives the impression of being unrelated to the group in question, and gives the impression that he or she finds merit in the ideological claims of the political party.” The internet is used by certain Putin supporters whose advocacy frequently gives the appearance of being tainted.

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center

Today in the Khamovnichesky Court, German Gref, the Head of Sberbank and the former Industry and Trade Minister, has been giving his testimony. So far, after being questioned by Mikhail Khodorkovsky himself, Gref confirmed several of the defence team’s arguments, countering the prosecution’s indictment:

• Gref has confirmed that YUKOS’s purchases of oil from its subsidiaries at prices lower than those at European ports were completely legal. The difference in price could be explained by a number of factors, including export tax regulations. He noted: “They purchased oil from their subsidiaries legally, at the prices lower than European [prices]. This can be explained by the specifics of the export taxation [laws] at those times.”
• Gref said that – if all of YUKOS’s oil output (and 20 % of Russia’s total oil output) had been embezzled at any time between 2000 and 2007 – he would have learnt about it in one way or another.

Comment:
Mr Gref´s appearance in court led the ARD, one of Germany´s main television companies under public law, to broadcast an informative report about the second YUKOS trial in the day´s “Tagesschau” (8 p.m.). Therein, the legitimacy of the whole court proceedings was openly put into question. The ARD, as well as other TV channels, had been excluded from today´s hearing itself; however, they interviewed Mrs Moskalenko and Mr Rivkin, two members of the defence team, about the current events in the courtroom. The lawyers expressed their confidence that they would be able to reveal the truth with respect to the present legal case, with the help of the testimony of witnesses and also with the help of the partly absurd questions asked by the prosecutors and the judge. The report ended with the statement that Russia is still rather far away from being a state under the rule of law.
Maren Koop

Mikhail Khodorkovsky has objected to the court’s ruling which prevented expert Kevin Dages from presenting his research. He said:

“As his ruling, the judge said that the expert in international accounting has no relation to the case. Clearly this contradicts the materials of the case, the indictment, in particular book 7 of the indictment document contains a detailed analysis of the YUKOS accounting US GAAP reports by the prosecution. The judge also said that the accused are not accused of the actions related to the territories of foreign countries; this clearly contradicts a number of statements in the indictment regarding deals with international companies registered abroad, see p.20 of the indictment.

The judge also said that YUKOS was not an international company but a joint stock company, registered under the Russian legislation. This shows his deep misunderstanding of the merits of the case, it indicates that he is trying to avoid to get to the merits of the case, which is the only court’s responsibility, since all international companies are registered in this or that jurisdiction.

Pages 141-143 of the indictment document read that since the end of 2003 the YUKOS assets were located in its international companies and only later were they sold. International companies are listed in the indictment.

Neither the judge, nor the prosecutors are specialists in US GAAP accounting. Such specialists were not involved in the investigation despite the fact that the accounting report and the annexes to it provide the content for the book 131 of the criminal case and a number of other [case] books that the prosecutors refer to in their indictment.

All of the above leads to a conclusion that the judge has no intention to get to the merits of the case.”